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REAL PROPERTY
The propriety of words is the safety of property.-Latin
Maxim, JENKINS, EXCHEQUER REPORTS No. 16 (1885).
CURRENT CHANGES IN ILLINOIS
REAL PROPERTY LAW
HUGH A. BRODKEY
INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade significant changes have taken place in the Illinois
law of Real Property. The General Assembly has labored diligently and well.
Notable contributions include the Marketability of Title Act, the Reverters
Act, the Twenty-year Limitations Act with respect to mortgages and the
amendments reducing the redemption period in mortgage foreclosure sales.
Our court decisions during this period also mark a long step forward in the
struggle for justice. Conspicuously present in recent times is the tendency to
lay less stress on stare decisis and to look beyond the borders of the state for
guidance. For example, in holding that a surviving joint tenant cannot acquire
title by murder our court cited decisions from other jurisdictions and over-
threw a relatively recent Illinois Supreme Court holding. In the unreported
Garfield Park case, which has now become moot, our court indicated that it
would overrule a prior Illinois decision and follow decisions from other juris-
dictions. The requirement of mutuality of remedy in specific performance
suits was discarded in like fashion. And so the story goes. A lesson to be
gleaned in culling through the recent decisions is that it is unsafe for the prac-
ticing lawyer nowadays to rely upon the Illinois case in point. The precedent
itself must be examined and its true worth analyzed. If it embodies a rule un-
worthy of perpetuation the chances are good that our Supreme Court will
discard it. To be sure, the burdens thus placed upon the practicing lawyer are
rigorous and exacting. He must keep abreast of developments in the law else-
where. He must determine when a rule is ripe for revision. To aid the court in
writing an opinion like that in Dini v. Naiditch* requires legal scholarship of
a high order. That is on the plus side. If a lawyer wishes to be treated as a
member of a learned profession, he must equip himself for the task. In the
article by Mr. Brodkey that follows the scholarship is of a high order and the
research painstaking and exhaustive. It is worthy of the reader's careful atten-
tion. ROBERT KRATovrLt
- 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) (holding that a landowner owes a duty of
reasonable care to a fireman rightfully on the premises).
f Author of the book, REAL ESTATE LAW, currently in its third edition, Mr. Kratovil
was formerly an instructor of Real Property Law in the De Paul University College of
Law, and presently is an instructor in that subject at the American Savings and Loan
Institute.
Mt. BRODKEY, a member of the Illinois Bar, received his A.B. and J.D. from the Univer-
sity of Chicago. He is an Instructor of Real Estate Law at the American Savings and
Loan Institute.
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ERHAPS NO BRANCH of the law is so thoroughly permeated withancient common-law rules, forms, and concepts as Real Property.The rule of decision in Illinois is the general aspect of the com-
mon law of England as modified by statute prior to the fourth year of
James the First (1606-1607).' The courts and legislature of Illinois
have given this statutory pronouncement the serious consideration
which it deserves, but it seems, at times, that it weighs as a millstone
rather than giving the security of an anchor. Illinois has been slower
than many other commercial states in modifying or eliminating the
forms and technical requirements of the common law, and this has
been felt particularly in the area of Real Property Law. With this
tradition, it is interesting to note the many situations which have arisen
over the last decade in which the courts or the legislature, or the two
together, have shaped the law to the needs of a highly complex indus-
trial and commercial state. Some of these changes have been greeted
by practitioner and scholar alike with a hearty, "Good riddance."
Others have created a storm of controversy over what may be inter-
preted as a governmental interference with the basic property rights
which are a foundation for our present society. Some changes occurred
as the result of painstaking work and advocacy by organizations of the
Bar and other areas of civic and governmental concern; others repre-
sented sudden legislative reaction to a particular fact situation which
presented itself.
I. SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
In looking at changes in the Illinois law of Real Property, two things
must be borne in mind-one is the interrelation of Real Property Law
with other "fields" of law, and the other is the effect of federal deci-
sions and statutes on state law. The American Bar Association and
many state bar associations have a single "Section on Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law." This designation recognizes the difficulty
(and practical futility) of separating the three. Disposition of real prop-
erty by will and descent, claims against decedents' estates, future inter-
ests, powers and duties of fiduciaries with regard to real estate, are all
linked. Taxation has become closely related to the ownership of real
estate, creating new interests both on behalf of the government and of
private individuals. The laws of divorce and adoption affect rights in
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 28, S 1 (1959). Specified statutes and purely local laws are
excepted.
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land. Corporation law includes the power of corporations to hold and
deal with land. For purposes of this symposium, the present article ex-
cludes many changes in these areas of the law and it is hoped that infor-
mation on these points will be found in other articles.
The subject of Real Property Law does, however, lend itself to cer-
tain subdivisions. Perhaps the greatest volume of case law and statutes
concerning real property over the last ten years is in the area of direct
governmental control of real property through zoning, condemnation,
and the creation of new public bodies. The powers of municipal cor-
porations to hold and use land, urban renewal, area planning, and simi-
lar subjects will be treated elsewhere.
The second major consideration is the effect of federal law on Illinois
Real Property Law. The INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 has had a
broad effect on real estate practices in Illinois. Whatever practices the
Illinois law might permit, the decision as to the form to use often de-
pends on the tax consequences.2 A more direct effect of federal law on
local law is in the area of federal tax liens. The federal government can
establish a claim against Illinois real estate under any one of a number
of tax laws.3 Many cases over the past ten years have dealt with the
question of the relative priority of federal tax liens and other forms of
liens and interests created by state law.4 Some cases dealt with constitu-
tional questions relating to governmental powers with regard to land.'
Some federal statutes dealt with specific interests in land owned by the
federal government.' The present article will not deal with these federal
2 See, e.g., Young, Tax Consequences of Real Estate Financing, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 360.
a Nonpayment of any of the following may result in a federal tax lien: income taxes,
withholding taxes on wages, estate and gift taxes, employment taxes under the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act, the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and the Federal Un-
employment Tax Act, retailer's excise taxes, manufacturer's excise taxes, a wide variety
of miscellaneous excise taxes, taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and other items.
4 For an analysis of title problems inherent in the federal lien system see The Relative
Priority of Government and Private Liens, an address by Harold L. Reeve before the
American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law, August
27, 1956. For discussion see United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010
(1956), reversing 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237
(1960); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
5 E.g., in Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n. v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d
114 (1955), it was held that a racial restriction on land created by means of a fee de-
terminable on a special limitation enforceable by reverter required no action by a court
and, hence, was not prohibited by the fourteenth amendment as interpreted in Shelley
v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6 Exec. Order No. 9908, 12 Fed. Reg. 8223 (1947), required, under the terms of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, that all conveyances of government land expressly reserve
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matters but will limit itself to Illinois cases and legislation during the
period from 1951 through 1960.
It would be a monumental and, possibly, meaningless task to cata-
logue every appellate decision and statute over the last ten years affect-
ing real estate. What has been attempted is the notation of those par-
ticular developments in Real Property Law which give the clearest in-
sight into the method and direction of legal change in this area.
II. TRANSFERRING TITLE-MARKETABILITY
Perhaps the most far-reaching trend in decisions and legislation over
the past decade has been in the area of making real estate titles more
easily transferable. This trend has taken two paths-by direct elimina-
tion of some conveyancing "technicalities," and by extension of
"limitations" acts to eliminate potential attacks on title. Both are char-
acterized by gradually broadening legislative action. The first of these
paths is typified by the 1951 statute abolishing the need for private
seals on written contracts, deeds, mortgages, or any other written in-
strument or document which heretofore required a seal.' The legisla-
ture simultaneously amended the deed, mortgage, and acknowledg-
ment forms of the Conveyance Act to reflect the fact that a seal would
not be necessary.8 It was safe to assume, and it has been true in prac-
tice, that despite these statutory changes, deeds and mortgages would
continue to be drawn reflecting a personal seal of the grantor. In anti-
cipation of this, the statute states that the addition of such a seal to an
instrument shall not in any manner affect its force, validity, character,
or construction." This legislative abolition of the ancient form fol-
lowed a succession of "half-way" measures, such as the statute creating
to the federal government the rights to all uranium, thorium, or other materials essen-
tial to the production of fissionable material. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 per-
mitted release of these rights. 42 U.S.C.A. S 2098(b) (1957). A further amendment in
1958 quitclaimed all rights previously reserved. 42 U.S.C.A. S 2098(b) (Supp. 1960).
7 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 153 (b) (1959).
8 ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 1, 8, 9, 10, 25 (1959). However, a corporate seal is not dis-
pensed with by the statute. Ops. ILL. ATr'y GEN., 41 ILL. B.J. 92 (1952).
9 The effect on contracts is open to question. See Comment, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 250
(1952); Note, 1954 U. ILL. L. F. 113. The common-law effect of a seal to purport con-
sideration raises a question as to the proper form for a conveyance of land by gift-
that is, a conveyance without either "good" or "valuable" consideration. Must a con-
sideration be stated in every conveyance instrument? See Hill v. Bowen, 8 Il1.2d 527,
134 N.E.2d 769 (1956); Redmond v. Cass, 226 I11. 120, 80 N.E. 708 (1907); Catlin Coal
Co. v.Lloyd, 180 111. 398, 54 N.E. 214 (1899); (all decided prior to the act "abolishing"
the need for private seals), and see Note, 1956 U. ILL. L. F. 513.
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a presumption that a recorded instrument was under seal if it so recited
(even though the recorded copy showed no seal),1" and the statute de-
claring that when a deed recited it had been sealed, the grantor shall be
held to have adopted whatever seal appears on the instrument (includ-
ing that of the notary public taking the acknowledgment)."
Case law serving to soften the omission of traditional conveyancing
forms includes the decision in Berigan v. Berrigan,12 that an unac-
knowledged deed is entitled to the presumption that it was executed
and delivered on the date it bears."5
The second path to easier transferring of titles-by extension of
"limitations" acts-has within it the seeds of both a semantic and prac-
tical problem. The term "limitations act" is often used loosely to de-
scribe both the type of act which declares a maximum time for the
bringing of an action and the type of act which declares an interest to
be terminated upon failure to perform a certain act. Ease in transfer-
ring titles is facilitated in inverse proportion to the number of places a
buyer must go to check ownership. If all matters affecting title could
be determined without going outside the record, and the record were
kept up to date, the most serious problems of marketability would be
solved. Query: What kind of "limitations act" best accomplishes this
purpose?
The extension of these acts in the field of real property was high-
lighted by the passage of the so-called Reverter Act in 1947.'4 This act
declared possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry for breach of a
condition subsequent inalienable, limited the life of such rights to
fifty years from the date of creation, and limited the time for enforce-
ment of such rights where they were created more than fifty years
before. Certain exceptions are specified. The constitutionality of this
act was upheld in 1955 in Trustees of School v. Batdorf.15 In that case,
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the contention that such an act im-
paired the obligation of contracts, was an ex post facto law, or de-
prived persons of their property without due process of law in viola-
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 34 (1959).
11 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, S 34a (1959). This 1941 legislation included a section
validating all unsealed deeds or mortgages previously made. I1. Laws 1941, at 416.
12 413 Ill. 204, 108 N.E.2d 438 (1952).
13 This does not, of course, do away with the need for an acknowledgment, espe-
cially as a requisite for the release of homestead. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, § 4 (1959).
14 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 37b-h (1959).
15 6 Ill.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
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tion of the state and federal constitutions. The court also made spe-
cific mention of the commercial and social desirability of such legisla-
tion. 6
In 1953, the Legislature added to the Limitations Act three sections
which served to limit to seven years the time for bringing an action for
the recovery of land by reason of the breach of a condition subse-
quent,17 or by reason of the termination of an estate upon limitation or
of an estate upon conditional limitation.18 Existing actions are limited
in the time in which they may be brought and mortgages and leases are
specifically excluded from the effect of the statutes.' The old question
of when the statute starts to run-that is, whether a continuing breach
is a series of separate breaches which would entitle subsequent owners
to bring an action-is specifically resolved in the negative by section la
of the act. Continuing, successive, or recurring breaches shall not ex-
tend the time for commencing the action or making the entry. In the
past, the effect of this statute was achieved through the application of
a doctrine of waiver2° or adverse possession. 21
In 1955, the Supreme Court of Illinois was also asked to rule on the
constitutionality and effect of section 1 lb of the Limitations Act,22
which placed certain restrictions on the term of lien of existing mort-
gages, trust deeds, and vendor's liens. By this section, the lien was
limited in time and would cease at the end of the limitation period un-
less affirmative action were taken by the person claiming such lien by
way of recording an instrument.
Prior to this statute, the existing limitations act, section 11, had re-
quired that any action or foreclosure sale must be brought within ten
years of the time when the right of action or sale accrued. This section
had, however, been construed by the court in connection with the
limitation statute on promissory notes (permitting unrecorded exten-
sions) ,21 and the effect was to keep the mortgage alive until the debt
16 Id. at 492, 130 N.E.2d at 113. The court did, however, question whether such a
result could not have been better achieved by extending the powers of Equity over
such interests.
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, S la (1959).
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, 5 lb (1959).
19 ILL. RE. STAT. ch. 83, i lc (1959).
20 See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 278 I1. 529, 116 N.E.
161 (1917).
21 See Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 390 111. 619,61 N.E.2d 552 (1945).
2 2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, S lib (1959).
23 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, S 17 (1959).
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was barred. 4 In Livingston v. Meyers,25 the court was faced with a
specific performance suit based upon a 1954 abstract showing a 1930
trust deed which secured a note due in 1933. There had been no re-
cording as required by section 1 lb and the court had to determine
whether the effect of the section was to terminate the lien completely.
After reviewing the legislative intent to make titles merchantable and to
replace in the "flow of commerce" properties "needed in our social,
economic and commercial life,"'26 the court dismissed the constitutional
argument that the act takes away a mortgagee's right to possession and
his title after condition broken, by stating that "Section 1 lb could un-
der no circumstances be the operative fact of vesting or divesting title
in a mortgagee, since it only determines whether a lien does or does not
exist."27
Two points should be noted in connection with this act and the de-
cision construing it: (1) The act does more than limit the bringing of
an action; in effect, it limits the length of existence of a property right
in the absence of affirmative action. But (2) that is not to say that if a
mortgagee fails to file the necessary instrument of record the right is
extinguished as between the parties.2 8 The net result, then is, as the
court points out, an aid to merchantability-a means for keeping the
record up to date. 9
If section 1 lb had this effect on mortgages, why not have legislation
affecting all ancient claims? In 1959, the Legislature passed the so-called
"Merchantability of Title Act."30 In the publicity accompanying this
legislation, lawyers sometimes tended to overlook the fact that Illinois
has had a marketable title act since 1941. 31 This latter act specified that
no document or fact which was over seventy-five years old could be
considered notice of any claim or right in real estate and could not be
admitted in evidence or used to make any title unmarketable; nor
24 Kraft v. Holzmann, 206 111. 248, 69 N.E. 574 (1903).
25 6 Ill.2d 325, 129 N.E.2d 12 (1955).
268 d. at 332, 129 N.E.2d at 15.
27 Id. at 336, 129 N.E.2d at 17.
28 Zyks v. Bowen, 351 IM. App. 491, 115 N.E,2d 557 (1953), petition for leave to appeal
denied, 5 IlM. App.2d v (1955), involving a suit between a trustee under a trust deed and
the heirs of the mortgagor. A written, unrecorded extension agreement was in existence.
29 See also Comment, The Statute of Limitations as a Defense to Foreclosure in Illi-
nois, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 469.
30 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, SS 10a-12.1 (1959).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 10a (1959).
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would it serve as the basis for an action to affect real estate. The act
designates that it protects "parties hereafter coming into possession of
such real estate under claims or color of title," so it would not upset
rights existing at the time of the act. The claimant can extend his claim
for ten years by appropriate recording and persons under disability are
given additional time after removal of the disability to record. While
it may be debated whether this act is a limitation act or a true market-
ability act,3 2 it shares the following two characteristics with the usual
limitation act: (1) It excepts the interest of a lessor or vendor where
possession is held by the lessee or vendee during the period for record-
ing claims and that of a person who has not had a legal or equitable
right to sue on his claim, interest, or title; and (2) it makes an excep-
tion for persons under disability. The effect, then, is to require a per-
son to go outside the record to examine questions of possession and
competence. It has been observed that this statute is much relied upon
by title examiners, and that the Illinois State Bar Association has
suggested a Title Standard based upon this act.3 3 It is interesting to
note that in the twenty years since its passage, no appellate level litiga-
tion has arisen concerned with this statute.
The new statute is explicitly a limitation statute, stating: "No action
based upon any claim arising or existing more than 40 years before the
commencement of such action shall be maintained. . . ." to enforce a
claim in real estate against the holder of record title who has a forty-
year chain of tide. To preserve such a claim, the claimant must record
an appropriate instrument within a specified time. 4 The act does
not protect the holder of record title where the real estate is in the
adverse possession of another, and does not apply to the interest of
lessor or lessee, an easement which either is apparent or can be proved
by physical evidence of its use, a mortgagee where the due date of the
mortgage is stated or ascertainable from its face and is not barred by
section 1 lb of the Limitations Act, or any encroachment on a street,
highway or on public waters. 5 It explicitly applies to claims of the State
32 Yoder, Marketability of Title, 1949 U. ILL. L. F. 438, 447, refers to the "seventy-
five-year Statute of Limitations." SIMES & TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY
LEGISLATION 330 (1960), analyzes the act in the chapter of "Marketable Title Legisla-
tion."
33 Yoder, supra note 32.
34 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 12.1 (1959). The effective date of the statute is July 14,
1959. Claims and interests arising more than forty years prior to that date may be
eliminated unless a notice of the claim is recorded prior to July 14, 1961.
35 Simultaneously, the Reverter Act was amended to reduce its fifty-year period to
forty years. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 37b-h (1959).
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of Illinois but not to claims of the United States unless Congress
assents. It does not apply to Torrens property. The act specifically
permits recording of claims to be made by representatives of persons
under disability and unborn and unascertained persons. This act is
based on marketable title acts of other states. It is like the Iowa statute8 6
in approach, but has the advantage of a procedure for including claims
of persons under disabilities (so that one need not go outside the
record to examine these questions) and, while it excludes property in
the adverse possession of another, it does not require, as the Iowa
statute does, that the record owner be in actual possession (so that
vacant property would be covered by the act). The act, then, will serve
to keep the record up to date but will not protect against possessory
interests or governmental interests, and leaves protection against mort-
gage liens to the mortgage limitation statute.
The question of the act's constitutionality has yet to be decided, but
since the act serves only to require a recording or re-recording, rather
than cutting off rights or requiring a suit for enforcement, and since the
act is in the form of a limitations act, purporting to affect procedure
only and not rights, it is probable that its constitutionality will be up-
held.'7 Many questions remain unanswered concerning interpretation
of the act. For example, does the act protect a subsequent purchaser
regardless of his actual knowledge of a claim? At what time does an
interest "arise" so that one can start counting the forty years? Much
has been written on this type of act, but many ramifications are un-
certain."' The important thing to note in terms of legal trend is the
final provision of the act 9 which provides that the act is to be liberally
36 IA. CODE ANN. S 614.17 (1958).
37 See SIMES & TAYLOR, Op. cit. supra note 32, app. A, at pp. 251-69, 271-73, which
discusses all of the constitutional concepts involved in marketable title legislation. The
favorable attitude of the Illinois court can be implied from Trustees of Schools v.
Batdorf, 6 111.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955), and Livingston v. Meyers, 6 Ill.2d 325, 129
N.E.2d 12 (1955), referred to in the text.
38 The most thorough investigation of the theory of this type of legislation, the exist-
ing statutes, and proposed legislation is contained in a 1960 treatise entitled THE IM-
PROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING ay LEGISLATION, prepared for the Section of Real Prop-
erty, Probate, and Trust Law of the American Bar Association and for the University
of Michigan Law School by LEwis M. SIMES & CLARENCE B. TAYLOR. A Bibliography
on pp. 359-61 lists some fifty-nine works on marketable title legislation, including
BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES (1953); Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title
Acts, 50 MICH. L. REV. 185 (1951); Aigler, A Supplement to 'Constitutionality of Mar-
ketable Title Acts'-1951-1957, 56 MIcI. L. REV. 225 (1957); Cribbett, A New Concept
of Merchantability, 43 ILL. B. J. 778 (1955); Comment, Marketability Acts, A Step For-
ward for Title Examinations In Illinois, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 488.
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 12.4 (1959).
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construed to achieve "the legislative purpose of simplifying and facili-
tating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record
chain of title as described in ... [the act]." This section also specifies
that the claims extinguished by the act "include any and all interests of
any nature whatsoever, however denominated .... "
Marketability was further enhanced by modification and, finally,
legislative elimination in 1959 of the lien provisions of the Dram Shop
Act.40 The act gives the injured party the option of suing the tavern
operator, the owner of the premises who knowingly permitted liquor
to be sold, or both.4' Such a judgment could, of course, create a lien
against the real property of the person against whom it was rendered,
but the act went further and made the tavern premises liable for a
judgment against either the knowing lessor or the lessee, such liability
being enforceable by proceedings for the sale of the premises. It was
feared that such a lien might exist from the date of the injury. In the
1953 case of Hyland v. Waite,42 the Appellate Court refused to en-
force a lien against a bona fide purchaser of the tavern property whose
interest arose prior to the filing of the damage suit under the act. While
the suit did not answer the question of whether the lien came into
existence from the date of the complaint, the date of the judgment,
or the date of the initiation of supplemental proceedings to enforce the
judgment against the land, the question was made moot by the 1959
legislation. While this potential secret lien was eliminated, the benefit
of the more widely used secret lien-the Mechanic's Lien-was ex-
tended to professional engineers and land surveyors.3
Marketability was also furthered by certain validating statutes44 and
by at least one major change in Chancery practice. The doctrine of
Lis Pendens, codified as a section of the Chancery Act45 had the effect
of "tying up" land tides while chancery suits were pending since all
persons acquiring an interest subsequent to the complaint or petition
took subject to the outcome of the suit. By amendment in 1959, the
court was empowered to permit, "for good cause shown," the sale,
40 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, S 136 (1959).
41 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, S 135 (1959).
42349 IMl. App. 213, 110 N.E.2d 457 (1953), petition for leave to appeal denied, 351
Ill. App. xv (1954).
43 Il. Laws 1943, at 867, as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82 § 1 (1959).
44 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, 5 30 (1959), validating certain titles coming through
foreclosures.
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22, S 53 (1959).
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mortgage, lease, or other transfer of interests in the property free of
the result of the suit.40 Necessary precautions may be taken, including
the posting of a bond, and such an order cannot be granted where the
object of the suit is specific performance.
The law relating to adverse possession-long the enemy of those
who "rely on the record"-has not changed appreciably over the last
ten years.47 There has been a tendency, however, to protect some pos-
sessory rights which do not fall within the technical scope of the adverse
possession laws. 48 For example, adjoining owners who use a common
driveway by mutual verbal agreement may be treated as having created
revocable licenses (which could never ripen into an easement by pre-
scription) 49 or as having made a verbal promise to grant an easement,
which, being partially performed, may be irrevocable.5 ° This last point
is consistent with some earlier decisions which hold that where large ex-
penditures have been made in reliance on a license, the license may be
held to be irrevocable. 54
III. MORTGAGES
The adaptation of laws to the needs of a commercial society through
legislation is strongly illustrated in the field of mortgage lending. A
1953 statutory amendment was designed to protect foreign banks
and insurance companies which loan money on the security of Illinois
real estate. This statute states that any foreign corporation whose
charter permits it to invest and loan money "may, without qualifying
to transact business in this state purchase or contract to purchase notes
or other evidences of indebtedness or interests therein secured by any
security instrument.""2 Such a purchase by itself is not to be deemed
doing business and the foreign corporation is assured of the same rights
and powers for the recovery, servicing, protection, and enforcement
of such notes as private persons, citizens of this state. The power to
46 Ibid.
47 The case of Montgomery v. Downey, 17 Ill.2d 451, 162 N.E.2d 6 (1959), is note-
worthy by virtue of the fact that it pits a prescriptive easement against a natural
drainage easement.
48 See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 1, 4,6,7 (1959).
49 Muller v. Keller, 18 Ill.2d 334, 164 N.E.2d 28 (1960).
50 Anastoplo v. Radford, 14 ll.2d 526, 153 N.E.2d 37 (1958).
51 Girard v. Lehigh Stone Co., 280 Ill. 479, 117 N.E. 698 (1917); contra, Baird v.
Westberg, 341 M. 616, 173 N.E.820 (1950).
52 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, S 212 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
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deal with the security property is broad except that if the foreign cor-
poration acquires title to the property it must resell within five years.
While this act aids the investing of money in Illinois by outside lend-
ers, it raises the question of whether the investor may make direct loans
or must purchase existing loans.53
The use of combined real estate mortgages and chattel mortgages to
secure loans was simplified by a 1951 statute exempting public utilities
from the recording requirements of the Chattel Mortgage Act,5 4 and
in 1955 the recording section of the Chattel Mortgage Act was modi-
fied to extend the time for which a chattel mortgage can remain effec-
tive." The old statute, under which notice could be maintained for a
maximum of five years, was amended to permit the periodic filing of
affidavits to extend the notice to up to twenty years and ninety days.
This facilitates the use of long-term mortgages combining real and
personal property.
During the last ten years, the courts and Legislature were again faced
with the struggle of borrowers and lenders for protection. This see-
saw battle through the ages had resulted in the law of Illinois affording
fairly broad protections to mortgagors and persons claiming through
them, in the form of a fifteen-month statutory redemption period after
sale.50 Only two other states have a longer statutory redemption
period, and it has been estimated that an average foreclosure in Illinois
covers seventeen months. 57 Does this redemption period help the bor-
rower more than it hurts the lender? The lenders thought not, pointing
out that less than one per cent of properties foreclosed are ever re-
deemed.5 8
On the other end of the scale, as a protection for the lender, was the
statutory right to a deficiency judgment covering the portion of the
debt not realized from the property by the foreclosure sale.59 Was this
53 Prior to the amendment, Ill. Laws 1897, at 176, purported to authorize direct loans.
54 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95, S 1 (1959).
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 4 (1959).
56 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, S 18 (1959). In 1952, the Supreme Court extended this right
to a judgment creditor of the mortgagor whose judgment was not even entered until
after the foreclosure sale, and the court also rejected the contention that Torrens prop-
erty was not subject to redemption. Wojcik v. Stolecki, 411 I11. 443, 104 N.E.2d 288
(1952).
57 Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 420, 450.
58 Id. at 452.
59 ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 95, S 17 (1959).
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a valuable safeguard for the lender? Apparently not, since it was esti-
mated that only seven per cent of the dollar amount of deficiency
judgments is ever realized.60 The result of these two statistics (plus the
arguments of many interested parties) was a set of broad changes in
redemption law enacted by the Legislature in 1957 and 1959. To begin
with, the fifteen-month statutory redemption period-twelve months
for redemption by the defendant or any person claiming through or
under the defendant, and an additional three months for redemption
by judgment and decree creditors-was consolidated into a single
twelve-month period.61 The first nine months are open to redemption
only by the defendant and those claiming through or under him, and
the last three months are open to redemption by these parties or by
judgment and decree creditors. The question of priority of redemp-
tions and successive redemptions is spelled out in the statute.62
Secondly, the authority to waive the statutory redemption period
was extended. Corporations had long been permitted by statute to
waive this right at the time of executing the mortgage instrument.6 3
The effect of this waiver was to limit the redemption period to three
months, during which time judgment and decree creditors could re-
deem.6 4 In practice, many mortgagees asked corporate trustees to
waive the redemption period in the mortgage, relying on this act.
Whether the beneficiaries would be bound by such a waiver was un-
certain. Part of the 1957 legislation was to add section 18b to the
Judgment Act to permit a corporate trustee to waive the redemption
right when so authorized by the trust instrument or by the benefi-
ciaries. The waiver would not eliminate the right of judgment and
decree creditors of the trust to redeem within three months of the sale
and is not permitted where the property involved is improved with a
dwelling for not more than four families, where the proceeds of the
loan secured are to be used for such an improvement, or where the
land is agricultural.65
Two entirely new sections were added to the Judgment Act in 1957
60 Prather, supra note 57, at 452.
61 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §S 18, 20 (1959).
62 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, S§ 24, 24a (1959).
63 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, S 18a (1959).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, 20 (1959).
65 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, 18b (1959). Insulating these favored groups from the opera-
tion of the statute is thought by some to create an arbitrary classification raising con-
stitutional questions.
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to create methods of foreclosure which would reduce the statutory
redemption period to a minimum. The first provided that if: (1) the
decree of foreclosure found the value of the property to be less than
ninety per cent of the amount of the debt owing and if, (2) the mort-
gagee executed a written waiver of his right to a deficiency decree, the
defendant and persons claiming through him would be limited to three
months after sale to make redemption,66 and judgment and decree
creditors would have the succeeding three months."7 The procedure is
limited to the foreclosure of mortgages made after the effective date of
the act, July 1, 1957. While a deficiency judgment may not be too
valuable to a mortgagee, the right to collect rents during the ensuing
redemption period is of value. Did the waiver of a deficiency decree
mean that the mortgagee was abandoning this right to rents during the
redemption period? In 1959, the Legislature clarified this by amending
section 18c to state explicitly that the waiver barred any action or
remedy for the collection of the indebtedness against any and all per-
sons liable therefore, but that it did not bar the collection by the mort-
gagee of the rents, issues, and profits of the land during the redemption
period for the purpose of applying these sums to the deficiency.
The second method of foreclosure, introduced in 1957 by Section
18d,6s requires only that the mortgagor, after the institution of fore-
closure proceedings, consent to the entry of a decree vesting absolute
title in the mortgagee and declaring the debt satisfied. Any defendant
or any person interested in the premises through or under a defendant
has three months to redeem. Judgment and decree creditors share the
same three-month period.69 In either case, since there has been no sale,
the amount of money necessary for redemption is based on the amount
which the decree found was due on the mortgage. The original word-
ing of this section left this procedure to the complete discretion of
the mortgagor. If he felt the property would bring little money at a
foreclosure sale and a large deficiency decree would result, he could
"beat" the decree by filing his consent to the entry of a decree vesting
title in the mortgagee and satisfying the debt. This "loophole" was
remedied by an amendment in 1959.7o
The constitutionality of these changes in the statutory redemption
period has still to be passed on. Prior to the last-mentioned amendment
6 6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18c (1959).
67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, S 20 (1959). 60 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 20 (1959).
68 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, § 18d (1959). 70 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, u18c (1959).
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to section 18d, requiring the consent of the holder of the indebtedness
to any decree substituting the property for the debt, it could well have
been contended that vested rights of the mortgagee were being taken
away.71 It would also seem that if any of the changed provisions were
applied to instruments executed prior to the effective date of the
statute, the effect would be to impair the obligation of contracts.72 It
is interesting to note, therefore, that a retroactive effect was given to
one of these changes by the Illinois Supreme Court in Mt. Morris Say.
Loan Ass'n v. Barber.78 In that case, a judgment creditor of the
mortgagor was held to have no right to redeem fourteen months after
the date of the foreclosure sale, despite the fact that the mortgage in
question was dated prior to the effective date of the amendment. The
court argued that judgment creditors still had three months to redeem
as they had before the amendment, and that moving the three-month
period up to the nine- to twelve-month period (rather than the twelve-
to fifteen-month period) was merely a procedural change. In answer to
an allegation that this retroactive application of the amendment tended
to impair the obligation of contracts, the court pointed to the fact that
the judgment creditor was not a party to the mortgage. Query: Can
the amendment be applied retroactively as against a party to the mort-
gage?74
Two other 1959 statutes concerned with foreclosures are worth
noting. One is designed to protect purchasers at the foreclosure sale
and the other, to protect mortgagors. The first provides a method for
71 In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 M1l. 261, 270, 198 N.E. 4, 8 (1935), it
was stated: "Each bondholder has the absolute right to determine for himself, in case
of default, whether he shall take his loss and quit, or continue to gamble; if the property
is sold at public sale, he has a right to take his proportion of the best bid that can be
secured in cash, and cannot be compelled to become an owner of an undivided inter-
est in the property" (quoting from Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co.,
35 F.2d 513, 514 (10th Cir. 1929)). See also Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311
(1843); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844); Fisher v. Green, 142
Il. 80, 31 N.E. 172 (1892); Richardson v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 194 111. 259, 62
N.E. 606 (1901).
72 It has been pointed out in 3 JoNES, MORTGACGES § 1694 (8th ed. 1928) that the law
in force at the date the mortgage was signed is the law controlling foreclosure of that
mortgage and redemption from the foreclosure sale, since the remedy became part of
the contract.
73 17 ll.2d 523, 162 N.E.2d 347 (1959).
74 For a complete discussion of the history of the right of redemption and the effect
of the current amendments, see HERMANN, REDEMPTIONS FROM FORECLOSURE AND O'rHER
JUDILIAL S~ALES IN ILLINOIS (1960), an extension of an address by Milton Hermann before
the Real Estate Law Section of the Illinois State Bar Association, Nov. 6, 1959.
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a purchaser at a foreclosure sale to pay, during the redemption period,
principal, interest, or other amounts due under a prior mortgage, and
thus protect his interest.75 The amount paid is added to the redemption
price with interest. This supplements the purchaser's right to pay and
recover taxes and assessments due during the redemption period.76 The
second statute7 7 gives the mortgagor a temporary breather against the
effect of an acceleration clause. When the mortgage (executed after
the effective date of the statute) is defaulted and acceleration occurs,
the mortgagor is permitted within ninety days of service in a fore-
closure suit, or before entry of a decree of foreclosure, to pay the
amount then due (including costs and attorney's fees) other than the
accelerated amount. The suit must then be dismissed and the mortgage
continues in force. This relief can be used only once in five years.
Query: What is the effect of this statute where acceleration has been
occasioned by breach of a covenant to insure or repair, or a covenant
not to convey without approval of the mortgagee?
IV. JOINT TENANCIES
The struggle between ancient common-law formalism and the
needs of society is typified by the developments in the law concerned
with Joint Tenancies. Time and again, the Illinois Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the requirement that a joint tenancy requires the "four uni-
ties" of title, time, interest, and possession. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to determine the exact point at which one of the unities is destroyed
and the joint tenancy severed. In Jackson v. Lacey,71 a joint tenant
died after his interest had been levied upon by a judgment creditor and
sold, but prior to issuance of a sheriff's deed. The court held that the
joint tenancy had not yet been severed and the surviving joint tenant
took free of the judgment levy and sale.70 In Schuck v. Schuck,80 a
joint tenant died after a decree of partition had been entered and a sale
75 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, 5 28a (1959). 77 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95, § 17.1 (1959).
76 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 28 (1959). 78 408 Ill. 530,97 N.E.2d 839 (1951).
70 See Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 I11. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945), holding that the
surviving joint tenant takes where the other joint tenant died after the levy but prior
to the sale. What if the death occurred after the redemption period but prior to the
issuance of a deed? See Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 111. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945), which
states that the holder of a certificate of sale from a mortgage foreclosure has real
property even before a master's deed issues.
80 413 111. 390, 108 N.E.2d 905 (1952).
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had. The court held that the decree of partition severed the unity of
possession and hence destroyed the joint tenancy.
In Klouda v. Pecbousek,sl one joint tenant executed and delivered a
deed of his interest, an act which has always been considered as sever-
ing a joint tenancy. In this case, however, the deed was not effective
since the property was in Torrens and it had not been registered. The
court treated the deed as creating a contract to convey, vesting an
equitable title in the grantees and hence, severing the joint tenancy.82
Such a contract is to be distinguished from an executory contract
signed by both joint tenants. As the court affirmed in Watson v. Wat-
son,8 3 the death of one joint tenant after the execution of such a con-
tract by both joint tenants gives the survivor a right to the total pro-
ceeds. This is true even though the contract contains no provision that
the proceeds will be held jointly, and the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion will not be applied to defeat this as the obvious intention of the
parties. The court drew the line as to this carry-over of joint tenancy
attributes to the proceeds of sale in the case of Public Aid Comm'n v.
Stille. 4 The court affirmed the position of the Watson case, but held
that when a joint tenant died after the contract of sale was fully
executed and the purchase money paid to the vendors, the surviving
joint tenant was not entitled to the proceeds as joint tenancy prop-
erty. 5 While the result is understandable, it is interesting to contrast
the theory of this case with that underlying a 1955 amendment to the
Joint Rights and Obligations Act86 transferring the right of survivor-
ship to the award for joint tenancy property taken by eminent domain
proceedings.
Two other technical questions concerning joint tenancies were set-
tled by legislation in 1953. One was an amendment to section 1 of the
Joint Rights and Obligations Act formally permitting the creation of
estates in joint tenancy in an undivided interest in land.8 7 (This point
had been upheld a few months before in the case of Klouda v. Pechou-
81414 W. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953).
82 Lawler v. Byrne, 252 111. 194, 96 N.E.892 (1911).
83 5 11.2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955).
84 14 I1l.2d 344, 153 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
85 This decision is interesting in its discussion of the literature and decisions of other
states, some of which treat a contract signed by all joint tenants as severing the joint
tenancy (e.g., Nebraska and Iowa), and some of which, like Illinois, do not (e.g., Wis-
consin, Massachusetts, and Florida).
86 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, § 2(d) (1959). 87 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, § 1 (1959).
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sek, 8 relying on FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION (1874), and
on a California appellate court case.89) The other statute attempted to
overcome the technical objection to a conveyance by a title holder to
himself and another in joint tenancy. Such a conveyance lacks the
unity of time and title required of a joint tenancy and has always been
construed as creating nothing more than a tenancy in common. 0 The
resulting practice was the use of a conveyance to a "dummy" and
back, creating the fiction of the necessary unities. The new statute
states that in the future, any conveyance declaring the estate created to
be not in tenancy in common but with right of survivorship (or in
joint tenancy), shall create an estate with right of survivorship, not-
withstanding the fact that the grantor is one of the grantees. This
"estate with right of survivorship" "shall have all of the effects of a
common law joint tenancy estate."'" The new estate is not the com-
mon-law estate, but is declared to have all its effects. This leaves a
number of questions unanswered. How is the tenancy severed? What
happens to the creditors of the grantor if he survives the new grantee-
that is, does his title date back to the original grant to him or to the
date of the second grant?92
The attempt of the Supreme Court to make the classic theory of
joint tenancy comply with the demands of justice without the assist-
ance of the legislature, was illustrated in two cases dealing with the
question of one joint tenant murdering the other. In the first case,
Welsh v. James,"' the heirs of the wife contended that the surviving
husband (who was insane and had not been convicted of murder) held
the legal title to the whole property, but that one-half was held on a
constructive trust for the benefit of these heirs and that the other half
was held on a trust for his own benefit for life with the remainder to
these heirs. The court rejected this contention on the ground that
"joint tenants have one and the same interest accruing by one and the
same conveyance, at one and the same time, and held by one and the
same undivided possession, 9 4 and that to hold that the husband was
99 414 I1. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953).
89 Id. at 88, 110 N.E.2d at 266; 75 Cal. App.2d 580, 171 P.2d 152 (1946).
90 Dolley v. Powers, 404 111. 510, 89 N.E.2d 412 (1950).
91 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, § lb (1959).
92 For an excellent discussion of this and related problems, see Mann, Joint Tenancies
Today, 1956 U. ILL. L. F. 48.
93 408 111. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1951).
04 Id. at 2 3,95 N.E.2d at 874.
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only a trustee "would be to hold that by the unjustifiable killing of his
wife, for which he has not been convicted, he forfeited his right to an
estate in property which was vested in him, not by the death of his
wife, but by the instrument creating the joint tenancy long before her
death" 95 (citing Illinois Constitution of 1870, article II, section II, that
"no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of
estate .... "). In 1955, in the case of Bradley v. Fox,0 the same court ex-
plicitly rejected "the legal fiction that a joint tenant holds the entire
property at the date of the original conveyance, and acquires no addi-
tional interest by virtue of the felonious death of his cotenant." The
principle which influenced the court was the maxim that no man shall
profit by his own wrong. After reviewing cases of insurance law97 and
statutes relating to a murderer taking by devise or descent from his
victim,9 the court considers the way in which various states have han-
dled the joint tenancy problem.9 After commending the constructive
trust approach recommended by legal writers, including the Restate-
ment of Restitution (section 188b), the court takes a contract approach
instead, stating that there is an implied condition in every joint tenancy
agreement that neither party will acquire the interest of the other by
murder, and concluding: "It is our conclusion that Fox by his felonious
act, destroyed all rights of survivorship and lawfully retained only the
title to his undivided one-half interest in the property in dispute as a
tenant in common with the heir-at-law of Matilda Fox, deceased."' 1 0
When a person buys property and has title conveyed to another,
experience indicates that in the absence of evidence of an intention to
make a present gift, the purchaser probably did not intend the title
95 Id. at 24, 95 N.E.2d at 875.
90 7 11.2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
97 Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277, 7 N.E. 567 (1904); Illinois Bankers Life
Ass'n. v. Collins, 341 Ill. 548, 173 N.E.465 (1930).
9 8 
IL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 167 (1959).
9 Divesting the murderer of the entire estate: N.Y.-Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App.
Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (1935); N.J.-Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 110 N.J.L. 414, 166
Ad. 335 (1933); depriving him of one-half of the property; Mo.-Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948); imposing a constructive trust on the entire estate
held by the murderer for the benefit of the heirs of the victim; Minn.-Vesey v. Vesey,
237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952); Del.-Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d
923 (1951); Mo.-Barnett v. Covey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930); construc-
tive trust modified by a life estate in one-half of the property; N.C.-Byrant v. Bryant,
193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); N.J.-Nieman v. Horff, 11 N.J. 55,93 A.2d 345 (1952).
100 Bradley v. Fox, 7 ll.2d 106, 118, 129 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1955).
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holder to be the beneficial owner of the property. Courts of Equity
looking at this situation will declare that the new title holder is, in fact,
holding the land on a resulting trust for the benefit of the person who
supplied the consideration.'' On the other hand, a purchaser may have
title transferred to himself and someone else in joint tenancy. In the
absence of evidence of an intention to make a present gift, two prob-
abilities present themselves rather than one: Either the purchaser in-
tended his joint title holder to be merely his nominee (holding on a
resulting trust) or, while no intention of present gift existed, the joint
tenancy device was intended as a substitue for a testamentary gift.
Either way, the two "joint tenants" do not share the unity of interest
technically necessary to the creation of a valid joint tenancy.10 2 The
limitations of this approach were examined in several relatively recent
cases. In 1953, in Paluszek v. Wohlrab,10 3 some contribution to the
purchase price was made by each of the joint grantees, but the contri-
butions were unequal. The court refused to apply the resulting trust
theory and held that a valid joint tenancy had been created. The other
variation on this fact situation-that in which two people contribute to
the purchase price and the conveyance is made to one of them-was
considered in the Appellate Court in Merschat v. Merschat.0 4 In that
case, two brothers acquired title "in joint tenancy" but on the death
of one, his widow came forward to show that she had contributed part
of the purchase price of his share. The court reasoned that if he held a
portion of his interest as trustee for his wife, then the two brothers did
not have a unity of interest and the joint tenancy failed.
A final variation centered on the established practice of an owner
conveying to a "dummy" who immediately reconveys to the owner
and others in joint tenancy. In Kraft v. Kretchman,105 the Illinois Su-
preme Court considered a conveyance from a mother to a "dummy"
and a conveyance from the "dummy" to the mother and two children
in joint tenancy. The court was presented with the argument that since
the total consideration for the second conveyance was supplied by the
mother, no joint tenancy was created and on her death the two chil-
dren (or the survivor) held as trustees for her heirs. This argument
101 E.g., Baughman v. Baughman, 283 I1. 55, 119 N.E. 49 (1918).
102 Kane v. Johnson, 397 Il. 112, 73 N.E.2d 321 (1947).
1031 1ll.2d 363, 115 N.E.2d 764 (1953); see Comment, 42 ILL. B.J. 496 (1954).
t4 1 Ill. App.2d 429, 117 N.E,2d 868 (1954), petition for leave to appeal denied, 5
Ill. App.2d vi (1955).
105 17 I1.2d 71, 160 N.E.2d 806 (1959).
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was rejected by the court, stating that the fact of prior ownership by
the mother took this case out of the rule concerning consideration
advanced by one grantee and that the relationship of the parties cre-
ated a presumption of gift.
V. LEASES
The leasehold cases over the last ten years were concerned to a large
extent with a further definition of a lease as an interest in real property.
A lease has been defined as a chattel real partaking of the nature of per-
sonalty. 06 For many purposes, a lease is treated as personal property, °7
but in an increasing number of statutes, a leasehold estate is classified as
real property. This is true of the Judgment Act which states that the
lien of a judgment attaches to the debtor's "real estate" including
leaseholds with an unexpired term of more than five years. 08 It is true
of the Conveyancing Act, which applies to "real estate" including
"lands, tenements and hereditaments" and "chattels real."' 09 It is true
of the Revenue Act, which treats leases as real estates for purposes of
including them for taxation." 0 In 1954, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a long term leasehold was subject to the terms of the Parti-
tion Act affecting "lands, tenements and hereditaments."' Under the
new Illinois Savings and Loan Act,112 a savings and loan association is
permited to loan funds "on the security of real estate" which includes
"a leasehold title of not less duration than 14 years beyond the matu-
rity of the loan.""' On the other hand, the ILLINOIS INSURANCE CODE,
which formerly permitted domestic insurance companies to invest in
first mortgages on "improved unencumbered real estate, '"" 4 had to be
specifically amended in 1955 to permit investments in first mortgages
"upon leasehold estates in improved real property for a term of years
where twenty-five years or more of the term is unexpired, and where
106 Zimmerman v. Dawson, 294 Il. 380, 128 N.E. 546 (1920).
107 E.g., on the death of the lessee, the estate passes to the decedent's personal repre-
sentative, Thornton v. Mehring, 117 111. 55, 25 N.E. 958 (1885).
108 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 3 (1959).
109 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 37 (1959).
110 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 507 (1959).
111 Pierce v. Pierce, 4 ll.2d 497, 123 N.E.2d 511 (1955), affirming 351 Ill. App. 336,
115 N.E.2d 107 (1953), construing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106, SS 44-71 (1959).
112 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 701-997 (1959), passed in 1955.
113 hI.. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 791 (b) (3) (1959).
114 11. Laws 1953, at 1263.
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unencumbered except by rentals accruing therefrom to the owner of
the fee."""
A leasehold is not subject to dower,"' but it is subject to home-
stead. 7 Not only must a lease for more than a year be in writing...
and the estate mortgaged with the formality of a real estate mort-
gage,"' but a 1953 decision affirmed that to be valid, it must be de-
livered. 20
The relationship of the courts and the legislature in declaring the
law is shown by several cases dealing with the contract aspect of a
lease and how far the freedom of contract extends before public policy
is violated. The question focused on the right of a landlord, by appro-
priate language in the lease, to protect himself from liability for his
own (or his agent's) negligent acts. In 1953, in the case of Jackson v.
First Nat'l Bank,12' the Illinois Supreme Court upheld an exculpatory
clause in a lease of business property and permitted the landlord to
escape liability for injury to a tenant occasioned by a latent defect in a
stair railing on common stairs-i.e., a condition outside both the knowl-
edge and control of the tenant. While recognizing certain exceptions,
the court held that there was nothing inherent in the landlord-tenant
relationship which created inequality of bargaining power and that the
agreement was not against public policy.
In 1958, in O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co.,'22 this
same position was adopted by the court in a case involving a residential
lease, but it was suggested by the court that the question of defining
public policy in this area was a matter for legislative concern. A dissent
was entered in this case based primarily on the inequality of bargaining
power between residential landlords and tenants at the time the lease was
entered into. 2 ' The O'Callaghan opinion was handed down in Novem-
115 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, S 737.2 (1959). 17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, S 1 (1959).
116 Hayes v. Hayes, 259 U. App. 600 (1931). 118 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 59, § 2 (1959).
119 First Nat'l Bank of Joliet v. Adams, 138 111.483, 28 N.E. 955 (1891).
12o Kleinhaus v. Ohde, 350 111. App. 177, 112 N.E.2d 498 (1953), petition for leave to
appeal denied, 351 Ill. App. xv (1941).
121 415 Ill. 453, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953), affirming 348 11. App. 69, 108 N.E.2d 36 (1951).
122 15 I1l.2d 436, 155 NE.2d 545 (1958).
123 The dissent, Id. at 442, 155 N.E.2d at 548, noted the authorities relied on in Sim-
mons v. Columbus Venetian Bldg., 20 W. App.2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958), which
reluctantly followed the Jackson decision. A supplemental opinion was filed in the Sim-
mons case, based on the O'Callaghan case, and denying a petition for rehearing, 20 Ill.
App.2d 33 (1958).
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ber of 1958, and one of the first bills introduced and passed by the
legislature when it met in 1959 was an act declaring unenforceable a
lease provision exempting the lessor from liability for damages for in-
juries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence
of the lessor or his agents, servants, or employees in the operation or
maintenance of the premises.124 Such a covenant is declared to be
against public policy, but the statute exempts from its provisions any
business lease involving a governmental body or agency.1 25 In fairness
to the court, it should be pointed out that the benefits of strict contract
theory were extended to the tenant as well as to the landlord, and in
Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co.,120 a commercial lease contain-
ing clauses requiring the surrender of the premises in good condition
"loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted," was held to absolve a lessee
from liability for losses from a fire caused by the lessee.' 21 The deci-
sion was based in large measure on the Jackson decision, but while the
Jackson decision was unanimous, Cerny-Pickas had two Justices dis-
senting. 12 The dissent refused to interpret the terms of the lease as
creating an exculpatory clause. Meanwhile, numerous appellate court
cases reviewed and reworked the question of a landlord's general liabil-
ity for injuries to tenants129 and strangers.' 0
124 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, 5 15a (1959).
125 In Valentin v. D. G. Swanson & Co., 25 IMI. App.2d 285, 167 N.E.2d 14 (1960),
this act was held not to apply to a case which arose prior to the act, but since the
tenant's wife was the person sustaining the injury, the court refused to bind her to the
terms of the lease.
1267 ll.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100 (1956), reversing 4 Ill. App.2d 164, 123 N.E.2d 858
(1956), and 347 Ill. App. 379, 106 N.E.2d 828 (1952).
127 It should be noted, however, that while the court held the clause valid, it pro-
ceeded to construe it against the lessee in this case.
128 7 Ill.2d at 399, 131 N.E.2d at 105.
129 Compare Cronin v. Brownlie, 348 Ill. App. 448, 109 N.E.2d 352 (1952), with
Durkin v. Lewitz, 4 IMI. App.2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954), on whether the Massa-
chusetts rule or the Connecticut rule should be adopted to determine a lessor's liability
for permitting ice and snow to accumulate in common areas. Alaimo v. DuPont, 4
Ill. App.2d 85, 124 N.E.2d 583 (1955), distinguished the effect of a general covenant to
repair and a specific covenant concerning upkeep of an elevator. See Note, 1952
U. I-L. L. F. 417.
130 In Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368, 104 N.E.2d 231 (1951), the court restated the
existing law to the effect that a landlord is liable for injuries to strangers occasioned
by a defective or dangerous condition of which he has actual or constructive knowl-
edge and which existed at the time of the leasing. The court then set to rest the ques-
tion of whether a month-to-month tenancy is a single continuous tenancy or consti-
tutes a new letting at the beginning of each month. Reviewing numerous old English
and American cases, it held such a tenancy to be continuous.
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Since a lease is both a contract and an interest in real property, both
contract law and real property law came into play in the courts' con-
sideration of other individual lease provisions as well. 131
VI. CONTRACTS FOR TIE SALE OF LAND
The process by which law is changed by the court alone was dis-
played most clearly in a 1958 case dealing with specific performance of
a contract for the sale of land. In Gould v. Stelter,1 2 the Illinois Supreme
Court was asked to consider a contract which had been signed by the
seller and a nominee of the buyer. In dismissing the buyer's petition for
specific performance, the lower court relied on the equitable doc-
trine of "mutuality of remedy"-the doctrine which states that specific
performance is a permissible remedy only where the contract is such
that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by
either of the parties against the other. The buyer's failure to sign at the
time the contract was entered into meant that the contract was unen-
forceable against him then, and so he could not be permitted to enforce
it now. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court took two
separate approaches. The majority, through Justice Schaefer, after re-
viewing the 1858 case of Gage v. Cummings,88 which sets forth the
doctrine, noted that: (1) numerous exceptions had grown up in Illi-
nois; (2) other jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine as enunciated;
and (3) legal scholars have criticized the doctrine. The decision then
specifically rejected the doctrine as a bar to specific performance, and
used a quotation by Justice Cardozo: " 'What equity exacts today as a
181 E.g., existing ordinances are read into the terms of both a lease and a contract.
Warshawsky v. American Auto-Prods. Co., 12 111. App. 178, 138 N.E.2d 816 (1956),
held that the lessee's responsibility for rent could not be excused under the doctrine
of commercial frustrations since an ordinance existed at the time of the letting for-
bidding the proposed use. Noted in 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 156. In Schiro v. W. E. Gould
& Co., 18 Ill.2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960), a violation of a building code was held to
be a breach of a contract for sale of a lot and construction of a building. Noted in
49 ILL. B. J. 210 (1960). Contract law was applied in Valentin v. D. G. Swanson & Co.,
25 Ill. App.2d 285, 167 N.E.2d 14 (1960), and the similar case of Moss v. Hunding, 27
Ill. App.2d 189, 169 N.E.2d 396 (1960). Contract law affects the exercise of an option
to purchase, Gaskins v. Walz, 409 111. 40, 97 N.E.2d 798 (1951), and the question of
what clauses in a lease carry over into a renewal lease or a hold-over tenancy. Wanous
v. Balaco, 412 Ill. 545, 107 N.E.2d 791 (1952). The clauses in a lease which bind an
assignee may depend upon the doctrine of "covenants running with the land." Liberty
Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Vance, 3 111. App.2d 1, 120 N.E.2d 349 (1954).
132 14 Ill.2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958).
133 209 Ill. 120, 70 N.E. 679 (1904). This decision was based on a statement in Fn,
SPECn C PERFORMANCE S 286 (1858).
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condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will
operate without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or defendant.
... Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as its presence is
essential to the attainment of that end.' "184 Gage, and part of a subse-
quent decision, 8 5 are specifically overruled. Mr. Chief Justice Daily
filed an opinion concurring in the result but rejecting the reasoning of
the majority. 3 6 He first found fault with the majority's statement of
the doctrine, maintaining that the Gage decision-which emphasized
that mutuality must be present at the time of inception of the contract
-had been modified by subsequent decisions, all of which were con-
sistent. He then pointed out that the facts of the present case would
bring it within this modified doctrine, and criticized the new rule laid
down by the majority. "Such a doctrine, having been considered in
scores of cases and by many learned judges of this court, should be
discarded only when the case at hand demands it and then only upon
the strongest evidence of inadequacy.'1 7
It should be noted in passing that both the majority and minority
opinions refer to the 1956 case of Laegeler v. Bartlett,18 which stated
that where an unbound party submits to the jurisdiction of the court
for the purpose of asking for specific performance, he thus makes the
contract mutual.8 9 The majority in a sense treated this as the exception
that broke the camel's back. The minority treated it as a natural out-
growth of a rule which had already been modified.140
VII. LEGAL CONCESSIONS TO URBAN NEEDS
A number of points considered by the court and Legislature over the
last ten years were necessitated by the pressures of urban living. Illinois
184 Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490,494, 135 N.E. 861,862 (1922).
185 Wloczewski v. Kozlowski, 395 Il. 402, 70 N.E.2d 560 (1947).
136 Gould v. Stelter, 14 Ill.2d 376, 383, 152 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1958).
137 Id. at 384, 152 N.E.2d at 873.
18 10 I11.2d 478, 140 N.E.2d 702 (1957), citing Ullsperger v. Meyer, 217 I11. 262, 75
N.E. 482 (1905).
139 Moehling v. Pierce, 3 I1.2d 418, 121 N.E.2d 735 (1954), holding that tender of
performance by the plaintiff in a specific performance suit can come at any time prior
to the decree since Equity acts on conditions as they exist at the time of the decree,
not-as in Law-at the time of filing the suit.
140 For a consideration of the related problem of trying to obtain an order for
specific performance where one of two owners failed to sign the contract, see Madia v.
Collins, 408 II1. 358, 97 N.E.2d 313 (1951), and Ennis v. Johnson, 3 Ill.2d 383, 121 N.E.2d
480 (1954).
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had long recognized the doctrine of lateral support, based on a prop-
erty right which the owner of land has to have his land supported by
adjoining land. In theory, this right is limited to the support of land in
its natural state, and not support of buildings and improvements. 141 The
law in this area, and the related tort area dealing with negligent exca-
vation, has become fairly well defined over the years except for the
most practical question of who has responsibility for safeguards during
excavation-the excavator or the owner of the adjoining property.
Decisions on this point implied that if a building stood on the lot in
question, the owner of the lot had the responsibility for protecting
it,14 2 but in at least one case, the excavator who expended funds to
protect the adjoining improved land was denied recovery from the
landowner. 43 This question was settled by enactment of a statute in
1957144 which provided that the owner or possessor of land on which an
excavation is to be made must give reasonable written notice to adjacent
owners stating the depth of the proposed excavation and the date
when it will begin. If the excavation is to be not more than the
"standard depth" of foundations-defined as eight feet below street
grade or below the adjoining land-but it is deeper than the founda-
tions of the adjoining buildings and so close as to endanger the same,
the owner of the adjoining building must be given at least thirty days
to protect his property, together with a license to enter the property
to be excavated. The excavator need then take only reasonable care to
support the adjoining lands-exclusive of buildings. If the proposed
excavation is to be deeper than "standard depth of foundations," the
owner of the land upon which the excavation is to be made must pro-
tect the adjoining land and buildings at his own expense. 145
The practice of dividing tracts of land into smaller and smaller
pieces by means of metes and bounds description-free of the regula-
tion of the Plat Act-was severely limited by a 1955 amendment to
that act.' 46 The amendment requires the filing of plats showing ap-
141 City of Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231 (1875).
142 Snyder v. Sass, 174 111. App. 205 (1912).
148 Korogodsky v. Chimberoff, 256 111. App. 225 (1930). See also Note, 24 MINN. L.
REv. 852 (1940); Note, 50 YALE L. J. 1125 (1941).
'44 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, S 10 (1959).
145 The statute will not be applied retroactively. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago
v. Code, 23 11. App.2d 382, 163 N.E.2d 554 (1959).
146 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 109, S 1 (1959).
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provals by specified governmental bodies, in practically every situation
where a tract of land is divided into two or more parts any one of
which is less than five acres in size. The enforcement of the act was
placed in the hands of the Recorder, who can refuse to accept instru-
ments which do not conform to the act. 47 The exceptions to the
amendment underwent a revision in 1959 which purported to broaden
the exceptions, but which in fact had a restricting influence as well.141
As urban land becomes more scarce, and the needs of the com-
munity more pressing, park land attracts the attention of many. To
some, a park is a piece of wasted land which would better serve the
community by being converted into home sites, public parking facili-
ties, or schools. To others, parks are valuable havens to be preserved at
all costs. Both sides have centered attention on the question of defining
the terms of dedication and the diverse property interests which arise
from the designation or creation of a park. In 1952, Grant Park was
once again the center of the controversy-this time caused by the pro-
posed construction of an underground parking lot. In Michigan Blvd.
Bldg. Co. v. Chicago Park Dist.,49 the Illinois Supreme Court re-
affirmed its prior position with regard to dedications in general and
Grant Park in particular, 150 stating that while a park cannot be di-
verted by the Park District from the purpose for which it was dedi-
cated, and while Grant Park was dedicated solely for use for a "pub-
lic purpose" or for a park, and while the circumstances surrounding
the dedication of Grant Park resulted in a restriction against the con-
struction of buildings in the park, the construction of a public under-
ground parking garage would not violate any of these restrictions. The
prior cases concerning Grant Park also established that the dedication
created certain property rights in abutting landowners, which rights
are in the nature of easements. This 1952 case describes the easement
in question as one for light, air, and view.'5'
147 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 109,5 Sa (1959).
148 E.g., under the 1955 provisions, the act did not apply to "the division of lots and
blocks in recorded subdivisions." Ill. Laws 1955, at 2018. Under the 1959 amendment,
this exception is limited to "the division of lots or blocks of less than 1 acre in any
recorded subdivision which does not involve any new streets or easements of access."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, S 1 (3) (1959).
149412 IlM. 350, 106 N.E.2d 359 (1952).
150 City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Bliss v. Ward, 198
Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 705 (1902); Ward v. Field Museum, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909);
South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910).
151 The only prior attempt at defining the easement was in McCormick v. Chicago
Yacht Club, 331 Ill. 514, 163 N.E. 418 (1928), which included an easement for "passage."
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The other major decision concerning public lands was City of
Aurora v. Y.M.C.A. 12 In this situation, property had been conveyed
to the city by deeds and the court interpreted the deeds as creating an
express trust for public purposes. The court ruled that the city was not
authorized to convey property held on express trust, but volunteered
that if conditions warranted a change in use of the land the courts of
equity would have jurisdiction to modify the use through the applica-
tion of cy pres.15 3 A recent decision dealing with Garfield Park would
have substituted condemnation for equitable supervision of park land
held in trust.15 4
Another rule based on housing practice is that concerning the en-
forceability of "protective covenants" placed on houses in a "develop-
ment." In Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda,55
it was held that where the builder reserved the right to assign the
power to enforce these covenants to a homeowners association, such
an assignment is valid and the organization can bring actions in its own
name. While the result is not inconsistent with prior law, a new ra-
tionale had to be developed. 15 6
The last noteworthy concession to urban life was a 1955 ordinance
creating a new lien in favor of a municipality which is forced to bear
the expense of cutting weeds by virtue of a refusal of the owner to do
so.' 7 While the lien purports to be superior to all other liens and en-
cumbrances on the affected real estate, other than tax liens, notice of
the weed-cutting lien must be recorded within sixty days after the ex-
pense is incurred. The lien is specifically ineffective against any rights
152 9 Ill.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347 (1956).
153 It would seem that the general power of Equity to supervise trusts would include
the power to permit the trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust where necessary
to preserve the trust purpose. See FIscH, CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 198-
201 (1950). If cy pres were applied, rather than the deviation doctrine, the only neces-
sary parties to such a suit would appear to be the trustee, the settlor, and the Attorney
General. Stoner Mfg. Co. v. Y.M.C.A. 13 Ill.2d 162, 148 N.E.2d 441 (1958).
154People v. Chicago Park Dist., Nos. 36171, 36172, Sup. Ct. IM., Jan. 17, 1961,
overruling South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910
(1910). This decision was later withdrawn when the suit became moot.
155 11 Ill. App.2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
156 Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913), upheld the right of a for-
mer owner to enforce the covenant despite his not retaining any benefited land. See
Note, 1956 U. ILL. L. F. 651.
157 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, S 23-113 (1959).
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in the real estate acquired after the work is done and before the notice
is filed.
Besides the legislation mentioned, a certain amount of "housekeep-
ing" legislation modified existing laws to keep up with the rising cost
of living or the complexity of governmental record keeping.158
CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen a great amount of change in Illinois Real
Property Law. Working individually and together, the courts and the
legislature have struggled with established rules and forms to make
them serve the function they were intended to perform as a meaning-
ful guide to conduct. Some trends are clear; some areas of the law seem
to have been stirred by controversy but are still unresolved. It could
be asked: "Is the change coming too fast, or not fast enough?" It could
also be asked: "Has Real Property Law really changed at all, or only
put on a new appearance?" Perhaps the situation is best described by
Professor Karl N. Llewellyn:
Our society is changing, and law, if it is to fit society, must also change. Our
society is stable, else it would not be a society, and law which is to fit it must
stay fixed. Both truths are true at once. Perhaps some reconciliation lies along
this line; that the stability is needed most greatly in large things, that the
change is needed most in matters of detail. 159
158 E.g., in 1952, the value of the homestead exemption and interest was increased
from $1,000 to $2,500. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 (1959). Mortgage and
trust deed releases can be effected by separate instrument rather than by entries on the
margin of the record. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 9 (1959). Mechanic's lien notices and
releases are to be filed in the Recorder's Office rather than in the Circuit Court Clerk's
Office. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 7, 25, 35, 38, 42, 44 (1959). The recorder can demand
six copies of any plat left for recording. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 2 (1959). Microfilm-
ing of records has been expanded. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 31-34.1 (1959). All deeds
must have names typed or printed near the signatures and a reference as to the name
and address of the party to whom the future tax bills should be sent, and all metes
and bounds descriptions must be drafted so as to start with a general description of
the quarter section, or lot, or lot and block. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 34c (1959). Failure
to comply with this section does not invalidate the instrument. Ibid.
1 59 LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66 (1950).
